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Abstract. This paper deals with the use of the CAPM for capital budgeting purposes. Four different 
measures are deductively drawn from this model: the disequilibrium Net Present Value, the equilibrium 
Net Present Value, the disequilibrium Net Future Value, the equilibrium Net Future Value. While all of 
them may be used for accept-reject decisions, only the equilibrium Net Present Value and the 
disequilibrium Net Future Value may be used for valuation, given that they are additive. However, despite 
their additivity, the latter are not always reliable metrics, because they do not signal arbitrage opportunities 
whenever there is some state of nature for which they are decreasing functions with respect to the end-of-
period cash flow. In this case, the equilibrium value of a project is not the price it would have if it were 
traded in the security market. This result is the capital-budgeting counterpart of Dybvig and Ingersoll’s 
(1982) result. 
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Introduction 
The use of the CAPM for capital budgeting traces back to the 60s and 70s, when various authors developed 
a theoretical link between this asset pricing model and corporate capital budgeting decisions. Among the 
several contributions one finds classical papers of foremost authorities such as Tuttle and Litzenberger 
(1968), Hamada (1969), Mossin (1969), Litzenberger and Budd (1970), Stapleton, (1971, 1974), 
Rubinstein (1973), Bierman and Hass (1973, 1974), Bogue and Roll (1974). The decision criteria these 
authors present are seemingly different, but, logically, they are equivalent (see Senbet and Thompson, 
1978) and may be framed in terms of risk-adjusted cost of capital (see Magni, 2007a): the resulting 
criterion suggests that, as long as the CAPM assumptions are met, a firm aiming at maximizing share price 
should undertake a project if and only if the project’s risk-adjusted cost of capital exceeds the project’s 
expected internal rate of return. These classical papers are aimed at formally deducting a decision rule from 
the CAPM, but do not particularly focus on project valuation; although the net-present-value rule is often 
reminded, no explicit claim is made that the risk-adjusted cost of capital may or may not be used for 
valuing projects. The risk-adjusted cost of capital is presented as depending on a disequilibrium (i.e. cost-
based) systematic risk (see Rubinstein, 1973), but project value is often framed in a certainty-equivalent 
form (Bogue and Roll, 1974). As a result, ambiguities arise on the use of the project NPV as a decision rule 
or as a valuation tool, and uncertainties arise regarding the correct calculation of the NPV, using either the 
equilibrium or the disequilibrium systematic risk. Furthermore, while most contributions deal with the 
notion of net present value, the companion notion of net final value is also sometimes used for various 
purposes: capital budgeting (e.g. Rubinstein, 1973; Weston and Chen, 1980) value-based management (e.g. 
Young and O’Byrne, 2001),  management accounting (e.g. O’Hanlon and Peasnell, 2002), actuarial 
mathematics (Promislow, 2006).1 However, no thorough analysis is found in the literature concerning the 
relation between present values and terminal values. 
Only few contributions have drawn attention on these topics. Among these, we find Rendleman’s 
(1978) paper, which deals with the use of cost-based (disequilibrium) covariance terms as opposed to 
market-determined (equilibrium) covariance terms. The author suggests that if a firm were to rank projects 
on the basis of excess of internal return over equilibrium (market-determined) return, an incorrect decision 
would be reached. Weston and Chen (1980) reply that either the disequilibrium or equilibrium return may 
be used for ranking projects, if appropriate use is made of both. And while the equilibrium form of NPV is 
widespread for valuation purposes (in the classical certainty-equivalent form), the disequilibrium form of 
NPV has its own upholders as well among scholars. For example, Bossaerts and Ødegaard (2001) endorse 
the use of the disequilibrium NPV for valuing projects; Lewellen (1977) uses the disequilibrium NPV to 
value projects;  Jones and Dudley (1978, p. 378) compute the required rate of return of a mispriced asset by 
discounting cash flows with a cost-based discount rate (thus, they use a disequilibrium NPV); Copeland 
and Weston use cost-based betas and disequilibrium NPVs for valuing projects in various occasions 
(Copeland and Weston, 1983, 1988; Weston and Copeland, 1988). Some other authors are aware that the 
                                                 
1 Synonyms used for net final value are: net future value, net terminal value, , excess return , excess value created. 
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disequilibrium NPV is often used in finance, and warn against it claiming that this kind of NPV is a 
common misuse of the NPV rule: Ang and Lewellen (1982, p. 9) explicitly claim that the disequilibrium 
NPV is the “standard discounting approach” in finance for valuing projects, and show that such a method is 
incorrect for it leads to nonadditive valuations. Grinblatt and Titman (1998), being aware that the use of 
disequilibrium NPVs is extensive,  present an example where cost-based betas are used (see their example 
10.5) and claim that this procedure is incorrect. Ekern (2006) distinguishes between NPV as a decision rule 
and NPV as a valuation tool; he states that the disequilibrium NPV is correct for decision but not for 
valuation, and suggests the use  of the equilibrium NPV as well as other several equivalent methods. Magni 
(2007b, 2008) shows that the disequilibrium NPV, though deductively inferred from the CAPM as a 
decision rule,  may not be used for valuation purposes. 
 This paper, limiting its scope to one-period projects and accept-reject situations, aims at giving 
some clarification on these issues. In particular it shows that three conceptual categories are involved when 
the CAPM is used for capital budgeting: equilibrium/disequilibrium, present/future, decision/valuation. 
The results obtained inform that if the CAPM assumptions are met in the security market and a firm’s 
objective is to maximize share price, the investor may reliably employ either present of future values, either 
in equilibrium or disequilibrium format, as long as the resulting values are used for decision-making 
purposes. If, instead, the purpose is valuation, only the disequilibrium net final value (NFV) and the 
equilibrium NPV may be used, because the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are not additive. 
However, even the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV, though additive, have some pitfalls. If 
there is a state of nature for which they are decreasing functions with respect to the end-of-period cash 
flow, then valuation is unreliable. This result is just the capital-budgeting version of a result found in 
Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) concerning asset pricing in complete markets, and explains why the 
equilibrium value of a project is not always the price it would have if it were traded in the security market. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 definitions of net present values and net future 
values, in either equilibrium or disequilibrium format, are given. In section 2 four decision criteria are 
formally deducted assuming that the CAPM assumptions are met. In section 3 the equilibrium NPV and the 
disequilibrium NFV are shown to be additive, whereas the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV 
are shown to be nonadditive. Section 4 shows that additivity does not guarantee absence of arbitrage and 
that the two additive measures previously found may be in some cases misleading. Section 5 shows that the 
equilibrium value of a project is not necessarily the value a project would have if it were traded in the 
security market. Some remarks conclude the paper. Equilibrium in the security market is assumed 
throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified. Main notational conventions are placed in Table 0. 
 
1. Equilibrium and disequilibrium, present and future 
This section introduces the notions of Net Present Value (NPV) and Net Future Value (NFV) and shows 
that, under uncertainty, they are not univocal. 
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 Under certainty, Net Present Value and Net Future Value are equivalent notions. The NPV of a 
project Z with cost IZ  and end-of-period cash flow FZ  is given by 
i
FI ZZZ ++−= 1NPV        (1.1) 
where i is the (opportunity) cost of capital. The NFV of project Z is just the NPV compounded at the cost 
of capital: 
ZZZZ FiIi ++−=+= )1()1(NPVNFV .    (1.2) 
As 1/ −= ZZZ IFr  is the project rate of return, the NFV may be rewritten in excess-return form: 
 
ZZZ irI NFV)(return excess =−= .     (1.3) 
    
Therefore, the NPV is just the present value of the project excess return, calculated at the cost of capital: 
i
irI ZZ
Z +
−=
1
)(NPV  .       (1.4) 
Under certainty, the NPV is the current project (net) value, the NFV (excess return) is the end-of-period 
project (net) value. In terms of decisions, the NPV and the NFV have the same sign (as long as (1+i) > 0) 
so that a project is worth undertaking if and only if the NPV and the NFV are positive. The NPV and NFV 
are twin notions: both may interchangeably be used as decision rules and valuation tools. 
 
Under uncertainty, if the CAPM is used for measuring risk, the notions of NPV and NFV are not univocal. 
Depending on whether disequilibrium covariance terms or equilibrium covariance terms are used, we find 
disequilibrium or equilibrium NPVs and NFVs. We then give the following definitions: 
 
Definition 1.1. The disequilibrium NPV (dNPV) is the net discounted expected cash flow, where the 
discount rate is the disequilibrium (cost-based) rate of return of the project ZmZf
d
Z IrFrr /),cov(λ+= : 
   Z
mZ
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
I
λR
F −
+
=
)(cov
:dNPV .    (1.5) 
The first addend is the disequilibrium value of the project, so that Z
d
ZZ IV −=:dNPV .  
 
Definition 1.2. The equilibrium NPV (eNPV) is the net discounted expected cash flow, where the discount 
rate is the equilibrium rate of return eZmZf
e
Z VrFrr /),cov(λ+=  (with eZV  being the equilibrium value 
of the project):  
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Z
mZe
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
V
λR
F −
+
=
)(cov
:eNPV .    (1.6) 
As widely known, we have ( ) fmZZeZ R,rFλFV /)(cov: −=  so that we may alternatively reframe the 
eNPV in a certainty-equivalent form 
Z
f
mZZ
Z IR
,rFλF −−= )(cov:eNPV     (1.7) 
 
Definition 1.3. The disequilibrium NFV (dNFV) is given by the compounded disequilibrium Net Present 
Value: )/),cov((dNPV)1(dNPVdNFV ZmZfZ
d
ZZZ IrFRr λ+=+= . Therefore, we may write, in an 
excess-return format, 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−=−= Z mZfZZdZZZZ I rFrrIrrI ),cov(:dNFV λ     (1.6) 
 
Definition 1.4. The equilibrium NFV (eNFV) is  given by the compounded eNPVZ: 
)1(eNPVeNFV eZZZ r+= . Therefore, we may write, in an excess-return format, 
 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=−= e
Z
mZ
fZZ
e
ZZZZ
V
rFrrIrrI ),cov(eNFV λ    (1.9) 
 
or, using the relation ZZZZ IrIF =− , 
Ze
Z
mZ
fZZZ I
V
rFrIF ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−= ),cov()(eNFV λ .  (1.10) 
 
Remark 1.1 The project’s expected rate of return differs from both the disequilibrium rate of return and the 
equilibrium rate of return. For the sake of clarity, the three rates of return may be written as 
  
1−=
Z
Z
Z I
Fr       expected rate of return   (1.11) 
Z
mZ
fd
Z
Zd
Z
I
rFr
V
Fr ),cov(1 λ+=−=    disequilibrium rate of return  (1.12) 
e
Z
mZ
fe
Z
Ze
Z
V
rF
r
V
Fr
),cov(
1
λ+=−=    equilibrium rate of return  (1.13) 
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(see also Weston and Chen, 1980, p. 12). The disequilibrium rate of return in (1.12) is the risk-adjusted 
cost of capital introduced in the classical contributions cited above (see Rubinstein, 1973). Using (1.11)-
(1.13), Table 1 collects various ways of representing NPVs and NFVs, in either equilibrium or 
disequilibrium format, which are equivalent to those presented in Definitions (1.1)-(1.4) above.2  
 The following section shows that the proliferation of measures under uncertainty, while surprising, 
is harmless in accept-reject decisions, for all of them are validly deducted by the CAPM and the 
assumption of share price maximization.  
 
 
2. The four decision rules 
This section shows that the four indexes above introduced are logically equivalent as decision rules in 
accept-reject situations. To begin with, we have the following 
 
Lemma 2.1 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . Then, after acceptance of the project, 
 
.)()(cov lllfmZZfZ PPNR,rFλIRF −=−− o     (2.1) 
 
Proof: Consider firm l. Before acceptance of the project, we have, due to the Security Market Line, 
)(cov mlfl ,rrλrr += . 
Reminding that lll VFr /1 =+ , we have 
)(cov mlf
l
l ,rrλR
V
F +=  
and, multiplying by the firm value lV , we obtain 
).(cov)(cov mlllfmllfl ,rFλPNR,rFλVRF +=+=    (2.2) 
After acceptance of the project, the new equilibrium value is set as  
f
mZlZl
l R
,rFFλFFV )(cov +−+=o . 
                                                 
2 It is worth reminding that if the project lies on the Security Market Line (SML), then eZ
d
ZZ VVI ==  and 
e
Z
d
ZZ rrr == , i.e. the three notions of rate of return collapse into one. 
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The existing shares are lN , so the new resulting price 
o
lP  is such that 
oo
llZl PNIV =− , which 
determines 
l
Zl
l N
IV
P
−=
o
o . To actually make the investment the firm shall issue o
o
l
Z
l
P
I
N =  shares at the 
price olP .  The Security Market Line is now such that 
  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++=+ m
l
Zl
f
l
Zl ,r
V
FF
λR
V
FF
oo cov  
whence 
)(cov mZllfZl r,FFλVRFF ++=+ o . 
 
Having determined the new price olP  and the number olN of stocks issued, the latter boils down 
 
)(cov)( mZllllfZl ,rFFλPNNRFF +++=+ oo .    (2.3) 
 
Subtracting (2.3) from (2.2) we get to 
 
)(cov)()(cov mZllllfmlllfZ ,rFFλPNNR,rFλPNRF +−+−+=− oo  
and, using Zll IPN =oo , 
.)()(cov lllfmZZfZ PPNR,rFλIRF −=−− o  
Q.E.D. 
 
From Lemma 2.1, four decision rules are deducted. In particular, we have the following 
 
Proposition 2.1 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project disequilibrium Net Present Value is positive: 3  
 
                                                 
3 It is assumed that fR  and ( )mZZf ,rFIλR cov)/(+  have equal sign. If this condition is not met, the thesis 
holds with the sign of (2.4) reversed. 
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0
)(cov
:dNPV >−
+
= Z
mZ
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
I
λR
F
.     (2.4) 
 
Proof: From eq. (2.1) we find 
).(cov lllfm
Z
Z
fZZ PPNR,rI
F
λRIF −=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+− o  
 
whence 
.
cov
)(
cov ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+
−=−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+ m
Z
Z
f
lllf
Z
m
Z
Z
f
Z
,r
I
F
λR
PPNR
I
,r
I
F
λR
F o
 
Therefore, 
 
ll PP >o  if and only if 0dNPV >=− ZZdZ IV . 
 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2.2 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project equilibrium Net Present Value is positive: 
 
0
)(cov
:eNPV >−
+
= Z
mZe
Z
f
Z
Z I
,rF
V
λR
F
.    (2.5) 
Proof: Using eq. (2.1) and the fact that eZfmZZ VR,rFλF =− )(cov , we have 
)( lllfZf
e
Zf PPNRIRVR −=− o  
whence, dividing by fR , 
)(eNPV lllZ PPN −= o .     (2.6) 
Finally, we have 
ll PP >o  if and only if 0eNPV >Z . 
Q.E.D. 
 
 9
Proposition 2.3 Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project disequilibrium Net Future Value is positive: 
 
( ) 0dNFV >−= dZZZZ rrI      (2.7) 
 
Proof: From eq. (2.1) we have 
)())(cov( lllfmZfZZ PPNR,rrλRIF −=+− o .   (2.8) 
Given that  
))(cov()(dNFV mZfZZ
d
ZZZZ ,rrλRIFrrI +−=−=    (2.9) 
 
we have 
 
ll PP >o  if and only if 0dNFV >Z . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 2.4. Suppose all CAPM assumptions are met, and a firm l has the opportunity of undertaking a 
project Z that costs ZI  and generates the end-of-period payoff ZF . The firm’s share price increases if 
and only if the project equilibrium Net Future Value is positive:4 
 
( ) 0eNFV >−= eZZZZ rrI .     (2.10) 
 
Proof: Using eq. (2.1) and the equalities )1/()(cov eZZf
e
ZfmZZ rFRVR,rFλF +==− , we have 
 
)(
)1(
lllfZfe
Z
Z
f PPNRIR
r
FR −=−+
o  
 
and therefore 
)()1()1( lllf
e
ZZ
e
ZffZ PPNRrIrRRF −+=+− o . 
whence, dividing by fR , 
)()1()1( lll
e
Z
e
ZZZ PPNrrIF −+=+− o  
                                                 
4 It is here assumed )1( eZr+ >0. If this condition is not met, then the thesis holds with the sign of (2.10) reversed. 
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which leads to 
ll PP >o  if and only if 0eNFV >Z . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Remark 2.1 Propositions 2.1-2.4 show four ways of using the CAPM for capital budgeting purposes. All 
of them are CAPM-consistent. In particular, it is worth stressing that: (a) the disequilibrium NPV is indeed 
a correct decision rule; (b) the Net Present Value rule may be safely replaced by a Net Future Value 
(excess return) rule, either in equilibrium or disequilibrium format. 
 
Remark 2.2 The results obtained have some practical consequences. In real life, investors face several 
different situations in capital budgeting. In particular, information about the project may be extensive or 
partial so that project analysis may or may not rely on a scenario basis, and there may or may not be assets 
in the security market having economic characteristics similar to those of the project under consideration 
(representative assets). If appropriate information on the project is available (so that scenario analysis is 
possible) and/or there are not representative assets in the market, the investor must rely on an ex ante 
probability distribution to compute the covariance between the end-of-period cash flow and the market 
return, ZmZ I,rF )/(cov ; this means that he will equivalently employ the disequilibrium NPV or the 
disequilibrium NFV to decide whether investing or not in the project. If appropriate information is 
somehow lacking and there are representative assets in the security market, the decision maker may 
measure the covariance from historical return data of representative assets. The covariance so obtained is a 
proxy for the equilibrium covariance eZmZm
e
Z V,rF,rr )/(cov)(cov =  (assuming the market is in 
equilibrium)5 and the investor will therefore employ the equilibrium NPV or the equilibrium NFV. In both 
cases the decision maker is reliably supported by a pair of metrics that lead to correct decisions. 
  
3. Nonadditivity 
This section shows that the disequilibrium NFV and the equilibrium NPV are additive, whereas the 
disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are nonadditive. NPV additivity means 
 
2121
NPVNPVNPV Z ZZZ +=+   for any pair of projects Z1, Z2   (3.1) 
 
(analogously for the NFV). Therefore, to show nonadditivity it suffices to provide a counterexample, i.e. a 
pair of projects (or a class of pairs of projects) for which eq. (3.1) does not hold. 
 
                                                 
5 If the market is not in equilibrium, the historical covariances are not proxies for the equilibrium covariances and one 
must relies on the previous method (disequilibrium covariance); however, in this case one should actually wonder 
whether the CAPM should be applied, given that equilibrium is a fundamental assumption of the model. This issue is 
an important practical problem but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 11
Proposition 3.1 The disequilibrium NPV is nonadditive. 
 
Proof: Consider a pair of projects Z1 and Z2 such that Z1= ),( kFhI ZZ −+−  and Z2= ),( kh−  with h, k 
being any nonzero real numbers (note that Z= Z1 + Z2). Consider the function 
 
48476
444444 8444444 76
2Z
1Z
dNPV
dNPV
)(
),(cov)(:),( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−+
−+−−=
f
Z
mZ
f
Z
Z R
kh
hI
rFR
kFhIkhf λ . 
 
If the disequilibrium NPV were additive, then eq. (3.1) would hold and ),( khf  would be constant under 
changes in h and k  (in particular, we would have ),( khf = )0,0(f =dNPVZ  for all h, k). But 
 
2)],(cov)([
)(),(cov),(
mZZf
ZmZ
rFhIR
kFrF
h
khf
λ
λ
+−
−−=∂
∂
 
 
)(
),(cov
11),(
hI
rFRRk
khf
Z
mZ
f
f
−+
−=∂
∂
λ  
which, in general, are not identically zero; therefore ),( khf  is not invariant with respect to h and k. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 3.2 The equilibrium NPV is additive. 
 
Proof: Consider any pair of projects Z1 and Z2, with 1ZI  and  2ZI  being the respective outlays, while 1ZF  
and 2ZF  are the respective end-of-period outcomes. Let 21: ZZZ III +=  and 11: ZZZ FFF += . Using the 
certainty-equivalent form of the equilibrium NPV (see eq. (1.7)) we have 
 
ZZ
f
mZZ
Z
f
mZZ
Z
f
mZZ
ZZ
I
R
rFF
I
R
rFF
I
R
rFF
eNPV),cov(
),cov(),cov(
eNPVeNPV 2
22
1
11
21
=−−=
−−+−−=+
λ
λλ
 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3.3. The disequilibrium NFV is additive. 
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Proof: Reminding that )1(dNFV dZZZZ rIF +−=  (see Table 1) we have 
Z
mZZfZZ
ZmZ
Z
ZfZZmZ
Z
ZfZZZ
rFIrIF
IrF
I
IRFIrF
I
IRF
dNFV
),cov()(
)),cov(()),cov((dNFVdNFV
22
2
2211
1
1121
=
−−−=
−−+−−=+
λ
λλ
 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3.4. The equilibrium NFV is nonadditive. 
 
Proof:  Consider a pair of projects Z1 and Z2 such that Z1= ),( kFhI ZZ −+−  and Z2= ),( kh−  with h, k 
being any nonzero real numbers (note that Z= Z1 + Z2). Taking into consideration eq. (1.10) and reminding 
that 0),cov( =mrk  for all Rk ∈ , consider the function  
( )448476
44444444444 844444444444 76
2Z
1
1
eNFV
eNFV
)(
),cov(
)()(),( hrhkhI
V
rkF
rhIkFkhg fZe
Z
mZ
fZZ
Z
−−+⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛ −+−−−−= λ . 
Manipulating algebraically, we find 
e
Z
ZmZ
ZfZ
V
h))(I,r(Fλ
IRFkhg
1
cov
),(
−−−=  
with 
f
mZZe
Z
e
Z R
)k,r(FλkF
kVV
−−−== cov)(
11
 
so that  
)(
),cov(),(
1
kV
rF
h
khg
e
Z
mZλ=∂
∂
 
[ ]2)( ))(,cov(),(
1
kVR
hIrF
k
khg
e
Zf
mZ −−=∂
∂ λ
 
which, in general, are not identically zero. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained, showing that additivity is, so to say, two-dimensional, depending 
on the two pairs equilibrium/disequilibrium and present/future. 
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Table 3 illustrates a numerical example where a decision maker is supposed to be evaluating two risky 
projects. The security market is composed, for the sake of simplicity, of a single risky security (so that its 
rate of return coincides with the market rate of return mr ); one of three states of nature may occur with 
probabilities equal to 0.4, 0.3, 0.4 respectively. The risk-free security has a face value of 120 and a price of 
90. The risk-free rate is therefore 33.33% (=120/90-1). To compute the four net values, we use eqs. (1.5) 
(dNPV) and (1.7) (eNPV), while the dNFV (eq. (1.8)) and the eNFV (eq. (1.9)) are found by multiplying 
the former by )1( dZr+   and the latter by )1( eZr+  (eqs. (1.12) and (1.13)). Consistently with the 
Propositions above, the sum of the dNPVs (eNFVs) of the two projects is not equal to the dNPV (eNFV) of 
the project obtained by summing the two projects’ cash flows. Conversely, the eNPV and the dNFV are 
additive, which confirms the economic interpretation of these indexes as valuation tools: eq. (2.6) just 
represents the eNPV as the price increase times the number of shares outstanding, which exactly measures 
the increase in shareholders’ wealth if project is undertaken. 
  
Remark 3.1 It is worth noting that the the dNFV and the eNPV are risk-free-related, so to say, in the sense 
that the equilibrium Net Present Value is just the discounted value of the disequilibrium Net Future Value, 
where the discount rate is the risk-free rate of the security market: 
 
eNPV
),cov(
),cov(
dNFV =−−=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
= Z
f
mZZ
f
mZ
Z
fZZ
f
I
R
rFF
R
rF
I
RIF
R
λ
λ
.  (3.2) 
 
Referring to the example of Table 3 and, in particular, to projects Z1  and Z2, we have 6.41=8.55/1.3333 and 
9.66=12.88/1.3333.) This fact may be interpreted in  an arbitrage perspective. Suppose a shareholder owns 
n shares of the firm; before acceptance of the project the value of his portfolio is lnP , after acceptance it 
becomes olnP . Suppose he sells m shares, with 
oo
lll PPPnm /)( −= ; then the value of his investment in 
the firm gets back to lll nPmPnP =− oo as before acceptance of the project. If he invests the proceeds at 
the risk-free rate, he will have, at the end of the period, a certain amount equal to  
 
dNFV)()( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=−=
l
lllf
l
llflf N
nPPNR
N
nPPnRmPR ooo  
where we have used eq. (2.6)  and eq. (3.2). By undoing the increase in the firm value, the investor will 
assure himself an arbitrage profit equal to that part of the dNFV corresponding to his investment in the 
firm. To put it differently, the dFNV is the (total) arbitrage profit shareholders get at the end of the period if 
the project is undertaken. 
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Remark 3.2  The dNPV and the eNFV may only be used as decision rules.6 However, nonadditivity has 
something to do with decision as well. Given an investment, eq. (2.4) does hold, but dealing with two 
investments to be both accepted or rejected (or an investment composed of two sub-investments), one may 
not deduce that the portfolio of the two projects is profitable if the sum of the two NPVs is positive. In 
other words, before applying eq. (2.4), one must first consider the overall cash flows deriving from the two 
investments, and only afterwards compute the NPV. To calculate the NPV of each investment and then 
sum the NPVs is not compatible with Proposition 2.1. This boils down to saying that the disequilibrium 
NPV is dangerous if used for decision purposes, because decision makers coping with two or more projects 
(or a single project that is composed of several sub-projects) may be tempted to first compute the NPV of 
each project and then sum the NPVs. This procedure may lead to a different sign than the one obtained 
with the correct procedure. It is easy to show that there may be instances where the sign of 
21 ZNPVNPV +Z does not coincide with the sign of 21NPV ZZ + : consider again the example in Table 3 
and suppose the cost of project Z2 is equal to 48 (other things unvaried). A simple calculation shows that 
029.2)86.5(15.8dNPVdNPV
21 Z >=−+=+Z  while 084.1dNPV 21 <−=+ZZ  (i.e. this portfolio 
of projects is profitable or not depending on how the investor computes the overall NPV).  
 The same remarks obviously hold for the equilibrium NFV. For example, if one sets the cost of 
project Z2 at 45 euros (other things unvaried) we have 
089.3)77.10(88.6eNFVeNFV
21 Z <−=−+=+Z  and 05.1eNFV 21 >=+ZZ . 
 
4. Decreasing net values and project valuation 
The previous sections have shown that the eNPV and the dNFV are legitimately deducted from the CAPM 
not only as decision rules but also as valuation tools. In other words, they provide the project value (current 
and future respectively). This section shows that, despite their additivity, the eNPV or dNFV may be 
misleading in some cases. 
 Consider a project whose random end-of-period payoff is RF kZ ∈  if state k occurs, k=1, 2, …, n.  
The project disequilibrium NFV and the project equilibrium NPV may be represented as functions of n 
variables: 
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=
+−=
∑ ∑∑
= ==
n
k
n
k
k
Zkmmk
k
ZkfZ
n
k
k
Zk
mZ
Z
fZZ
n
ZZZ
FprrFpRIFp
rF
I
RIFFFF
1 11
21 )),cov((),...,,dNFV(
λ
λ
 
(4.1) 
                                                 
6 Given that the disequilibrium Net Present Value and the equilibrium Net Future Value are not valuation tools, to use 
the term “value” for labelling them is admittedly improper. 
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(4.2) 
where pk is the probability of state k. For functions (4.1) and (4.2) to provide correct (net) values, they must 
abide by the no-arbitrage principle. In other words, increasing end-of-period cash flows should lead to 
increasing values, ceteris paribus. Consider two assets Z and W that may be purchased at the same price. 
Suppose kW
k
Z FF =  for all k but s, with sWsZ FF < . Asset W  may then be seen as asset Z plus an arbitrage 
profit paying off nonnegative amounts in all states and a strictly positive amount ( sZ
s
W FF − ) in state s. 
Asset W’s value must therefore be higher than asset Z’s, otherwise arbitrage opportunities arise.7 From a 
capital budgeting perspective, given a determined eNPV and dNFV for project Z, project W must have 
higher eNPV and dNFV (assuming their costs are equal), which boils down to 0dNFV >∂
∂
k
ZF
 and 
0eNPV >∂
∂
k
ZF
 for every k=1, 2, … , n. If, instead, the project under consideration is such that8  
0dNFV <∂
∂
s
ZF
  and  0eNPV <∂
∂
s
ZF
 for some s    (4.3) 
the dNFV and the eNPV do not provide a reliable valuation, because they are inconsistent with the no-
arbitrage principle. From eq. (4.1) we have that 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−∂
∂=∂
∂ ∑ ∑∑
= ==
n
k
n
k
k
Zkmmk
k
ZkfZ
n
k
k
Zks
Z
s
Z
FprrFpRIFp
FF 1 11
dNFV λ   (4.4) 
and, owing to eq. (3.2), 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=∂
∂ dNFV1eNPV s
Zf
s
Z FRF
.     (4.5) 
 
Also, it is evident that  
                                                 
7From a stochastic dominance perspective, note that asset W dominates Z according to both first-order and second-
order stochastic dominance). 
8 Given eq. (3.2), one of the two conditions in eqs. (4.3), (4.8), and Prop. (4.1) is actually sufficient. 
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with  rmk being the market rate of return if state k occurs. Therefore, we may write 
 
smmssss
Z
prrpp
F
λλ +−=∂
∂ dNFV   and  fsmmssss
Z
Rprrpp
F
/)(eNPV λλ +−=∂
∂
. (4.8) 
 
Let us now consider project Z in Table 4. Considering its dNFV and eNPV as functions of 3ZF  (end-of-
period cash flow if state 3 occurs) and using eq. (4.8), we find that condition (4.3) is satisfied for s=3:  
0)6259.08518.0)(3.0(52.43.0dNFV
3
<−−=∂
∂
ZF
 
[ ] 0)6259.08518.0)(3.0(52.43.0
3333.1
1eNPV
3
<−−=∂
∂
ZF
. 
This means “the more the payoff, the less the value”, which is incompatible with an arbitrage-free 
evaluation. Note that project Z may be seen as the risky security plus an arbitrage profit that pays off 
nonnegative cash flows in all states and a strictly positive amount of 250 if state 3 occurs.9  Therefore, 
project Z must have a higher (net) value than the risky security. Given that the net values of the risky 
security are zero (for the risky security lies on the SML), project Z’s net values must be positive. Both first-
order and second-order stochastic dominance confirm the natural intuition according to which Z dominates 
the risky security. Yet, both the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are negative. They signal 
nonprofitability for project Z (the equilibrium value is 52.808, smaller than the cost) or, equivalently, they 
do not signal that the project gives the investor an arbitrage opportunity. This means that, if the dNPV and 
the eNFV are not additive, the eNPV and the dNFV have pitfalls as well, even though they are additive.  
 
This enables us to state the following  
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that  
(a) the security market is in equilibrium 
(b) condition (4.3) holds, i.e. 0dNFV <∂
∂
s
ZF
  and  0eNPV <∂
∂
s
ZF
 for some s 
Then, the eNPV and the dNFV may not be used for valuation (nor decision) purposes. 
                                                 
9 It is possible to set the project’s cost lower than the risky security’s price, so that the arbitrage becomes a strong 
arbitrage, with a positive net cash flow at time 0 and nonnegative amount (possibly positive) at time 1. 
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Proposition 4.1 bears relation to a previous result found by Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982, p. 237). The 
authors, dealing with pricing of marketed assets in a complete market, prove the following: 
 
Dybivg and Ingersoll’s Proposition (DIP). 
Suppose that 
 (i) mean-variance pricing holds for all assets, that is, )cov( mlfl ,rrλrr =−  with 0, >λrf  
 (ii) markets are complete so that any payoff across states can be purchased as some  portfolio 
of marketed securities; and  
 (iii) the market portfolio generates sufficiently large returns in some state(s), that is, 
 0)/1( prob >+> λrr mm . 
Then there exists an arbitrage opportunity. 
 
Remark 4.1 It is worth noting that condition (b) of Proposition 4.1 is equivalent to Dybvig and Ingersoll’s 
condition (iii), because 0)/1( prob >+> λrr mm  if and only if λrr mms /1+>  for some s, which means 
1)( >− mms rrλ  for some s, and, owing to eq. (4.8) and the fact that ps > 0 and Rf > 0, the latter holds if and 
only if 0dNFV <∂
∂
s
ZF
 and 0dNFV <∂
∂
s
ZF
 for some s.10 As a result, the two assumption (a) and (b) in 
Proposition 4.1 imply that the market is not complete. To understand why, consider that if the market were 
complete and (b) held, then condition (ii) and (iii)  of DIP would hold. But then the market would not be in 
equilibrium, otherwise arbitrage opportunities would arise (see Dybvig and Ingersoll, 1982, p. 238). 
Therefore assumptions (a) and (b) are only compatible with an incomplete market. 
 
The result presented in Proposition 4.1 is, so to say, the capital-budgeting counterpart of DIP. In particular, 
while the latter deals with pricing of marketed assets when the security market is complete, the former 
deals with valuation of nonmarketed assets (projects) when the security market is incomplete. The two 
Propositions are the two sides of the same coin and the two perspectives are reconciled (see Table 5).  
 
5. Equilibrium value and counterfactual equilibrium price 
This section shows that the equilibrium value of a project is not necessarily the value the project would 
have if it were traded.  
 Let us consider eq. (1.7) in section 1 above. It says that the eNPV is just the difference between the 
equilibrium value and the cost of the project: Z
e
Z IV −=eNPV  where 
                                                 
10 The implicit assumption is that 0>λ . If not, the two conditions are not equivalent. In our particular case 
described in Table 4, we have  102.1)6259.08518.0(52.4)( 3 >=−=− mm rrλ . 
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In finance, eZV  is known as the “equilibrium value” of the project. It is commonly believed that it is the 
price the project would have in equilibrium if it were traded in the security market (e.g. Mason and Merton, 
1985, pp. 38-39, Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 800).  But this equivalence does not always hold, as Smith and 
Nau (1995) clearly point out: 
 We also have some semantic problems defining exactly what is meant by the value of a non-traded 
 project. Earlier the … value of a project was defined as the price the project would have  if it were 
 traded in an arbitrage-free market …. This definition does not work well in general because the 
 introduction of the project into the market may create new investment opportunities and change  the 
 prices of the traded securities. (Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 804, footnote 7) 
 
If the project were traded, a non-trivial re-balancing in the economy would occur (see Ukhov, 2006, for a 
derivation of the mean-variance frontier). Let us call “counterfactual equilibrium price” the price the 
project would have if it were traded: we now illustrate a counterexample where the equilibrium value eZV  
differs from the counterfactual equilibrium price. Let us consider project Z introduced in Table 4. What if 
one counterfactually assumes that Z  is traded in the security market?11 First of all, note that the 
introduction of the project in the security market renders the latter a complete market. It is thus evident that 
project Z’s counterfactual equilibrium price cannot coincide with the equilibrium value 808.52=eZV  
previously found, otherwise conditions (i)-(iii) of DIP would be satisfied, and arbitrage opportunities 
would arise (which implies that the market would not be in equilibrium). This means that when the project 
is introduced in the security market, market prices shift so that the market moves toward a new 
equilibrium. How does the resulting new equilibrium turns out to be? Intuition would tell us that the risky 
security’s price should decrease to avoid arbitrage (given that the project dominates it), but this is not the 
case. It is easy to verify that, to avoid condition (iii) of DIP and achieve an equilibrium, the risky security’s 
price must increase and project Z’s equilibrium price must increase to a larger extent so as to be greater 
than the risky security’s price.12 Suppose the new equilibrium is as represented in Table 6.  The 
(counterfactual) equilibrium price of project Z is 121.57 and the price of the risky security is now 65.76.  
The market is now complete and arbitrage is not possible. The counterfactual equilibrium price of the 
project differs from the equilibrium value of the project (121.57≠ 52.808). The conclusion is that the 
equilibrium value in eq. (5.1) is not the price the project would have if it were traded in the market. 
Contrary to the equilibrium value, the counterfactual equilibrium price is rational by definition, in the 
                                                 
11 This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that a security with the same payoff as project Z is traded in the 
market. 
12 This result holds regardless of the number of shares of project Z (or of the security having the same payoff as Z) 
that are traded in the market. 
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sense that arbitrage is not possible in the resulting equilibrium. This means that the counterfactual 
equilibrium price is obviously the correct value of the project. 
 One might think that, for valuation to be correct, one should replace the equilibrium value with the 
counterfactual equilibrium price. Unfortunately the counterfactual equilibrium price cannot be univocally 
determined. Table 7 shows another possible equilibrium for the market where project Z is traded. The 
equilibrium counterfactual price in this second equilibrium is equal to 76.197, which not simply conflicts 
with the equilibrium value of the project, but differs form the counterfactual equilibrium price previously 
found. Which one of the two counterfactual equilibrium prices is the one to be used for valuation? The 
answer is not possible, because there is no way of anticipating how equilibrium is reached from a 
disequilibrium situation. That is, one cannot compute ex ante “the” equilibrium price the project would 
have if it were traded in the security market. However, from a practical point of view, one may collect 
statistical data and make an ex ante estimation of the most probable equilibrium the market would reach. In 
this case, the estimated counterfactual equilibrium price could be taken as the correct project value.13 
 
Remark 5.1 Proposition 4.1 just gives us the reason why the equilibrium value may sometimes turn out to 
be incorrect. The correct value measuring increase in shareholders’ wealth is indeed given by the 
equilibrium value if the market is complete and in equilibrium. Problems in project valuation arise only 
when the market is not complete and condition (4.3) holds.14 In this case, equilibrium value and 
counterfactual equilibrium price are not equal.  A project’s equilibrium value is therefore reliable only if 
the market is complete; in this case it does represent the (counterfactual) equilibrium price that the project 
would actually have if it were traded.15 
 
 
Conclusions 
The CAPM is a theoretical model aimed at valuing financial assets in a security market under the 
assumption that the market is in equilibrium. As widely known, the CAPM may also be used for capital 
budgeting purposes: a project is worth undertaking if and only if the project expected rate of return is 
greater than the (cost-based) risk-adjusted cost of capital (Rubinstein, 1973).  However, the role of this 
simple capital budgeting criterion has not been thoroughly investigated, so that errors and 
misunderstanding often arise in financial textbooks and papers, where the CAPM is incorporated in the net 
present value criterion in an unclear way, with no explicit indication of  
                                                 
13 From a theoretical point of view, upper and lower bound can be computed for the counterfactual equilibrium price 
(Smith and Nau, 1995), but whenever the cost is greater than the lower limit and smaller than the upper limit, the 
“optimal strategy is unclear”(Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 805), and decision is not possible (a further analysis must be 
conducted to reach a single estimated value). 
14 It is worth reminding that if the market is complete and in equilibrium, condition (4.3) may not hold (given that the 
equivalent condition (iii) of DIP may not hold). Conversely, if the market is not complete and in equilibrium, 
condition (4.3) may hold, as we have seen. 
15 Readers interested in the analytical expression of the mean-variance frontier when the set of risky assets is 
expanded by a 
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o the way it should be computed (use of disequilibrium data versus equilibrium data), 
o the purpose it serves (decision or valuation) 
o the relation excess return (net future value) bears to present value. 
This paper, focusing on accept-reject situations and one-period projects,  is just a first step toward a 
clarification of these issues. In particular, it shows that: 
 
• from the CAPM four decision rules are validly deducted: the disequilibrium Net Present Value, the 
equilibrium Net Future Value, the equilibrium Net Present Value, the disequilibrium Net Future 
Value. All of them may be interchangeably used for decision-making 
• only the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are additive, which means that they may be 
used for valuation purposes. The other two are not valuation tools 
• while logically impeccable as decision tools, the disequilibrium NPV (equilibrium NFV) may lead 
to incorrect decisions if decision makers facing a portfolio of several projects (or a project 
composed of several sub-projects) separately compute each project’s NPV (NFV) and then sum the 
values obtained. The correct procedure is: to sum the cash flows of the projects and then compute 
the NPV (NFV) 
• even if the market is in equilibrium, the project’s equilibrium NPV and disequilibrium NFV lead to 
an incorrect valuation whenever they are decreasing functions with respect to end-of-period cash 
flow in some state of nature (which implies that the security market is incomplete). This result is 
the capital-budgeting equivalent of Dybvig and Ingersoll’s (1982) result, which they find under the 
assumption of a complete market 
• if the above stated condition holds, the correct value would be given by the (counterfactual) 
equilibrium price the project would have if it were traded in the security market. Unfortunately, 
this price is not univocally determined ex ante and one can only rely on an estimated equilibrium 
price based on exogenous data about the market. 
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Table 0. Main Notational Conventions 
)( jj FF  
 
Asset j’s end-of-period random (expected) cash flow 
 
jI  Cost of project j 
)( jj rr  Asset j’s random (expected) rate of return 
)( dj
e
j VV  
Equilibrium (disequilibrium) value of asset j 
d
Zr  
Disequilibrium (cost-based) rate of return of project Z (aka risk-adjusted cost 
of capital) 
e
Zr  
Equilibrium rate of return of project Z 
)( ff Rr  Risk-free rate (1+risk-free rate) 
2
mσ  Variance of the market rate of return 
cov Covariance 
2:
m
fm rr
σλ
−=  Market price of risk 
)( oll PP  Price of firm l’s shares before (after) acceptance of the project 
lN  Number of firm l’s outstanding shares 
o
lN  Additional shares issued at price 
o
lP  to finance the project  
lV  (
o
lV ) Firm value before (after) acceptance of the project 
dNPVj Disequilibrium net present value of project j 
eNPVj Equilibrium net present value of project j 
dNFVj Disequilibrium net future value of project j 
eNFVj Equilibrium net future value of project j 
j=Z, Z1, Z2, l, m
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Table 1. Equilibrium and disequilibrium net values 
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Net Present Value 
 
Ze
Z
Z I
r
F −+ )1(  
e
Z
e
ZZZ
r
rrI
+
−
1
)(
 
 
 
Zd
Z
Z I
r
F −+ )1(  
d
Z
d
ZZZ
r
rrI
+
−
1
)(
 
 
Net Future Value 
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Table 2. Additive and nonadditive net values 
 
Equilibrium Disequilibrium 
Net Present Value Additive Nonadditive 
Net Future Value Nonadditive Additive 
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Table 3. Project valuation with the CAPM 
 
 Proj. Z1 Proj. Z2 Proj. Z1+ Z2 
Proj. Z1       
+Proj. Z2 
Risky 
security 
Risk-free 
security 
Market 
(3000 sh.) 
F  ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
10
100
130
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
80
50
120
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
90
150
250
  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
100
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
120
120
120
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
300000
213000
294000
 
Cost/price 70 30 100  54 90 162000 
Rate of return 
(%) 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
− 7.85
8.42
7.85
 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
6.166
6.66
300
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−10
50
150
  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
18.85
48.31
48.81
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
3.33
3.33
3.33
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
18.85
48.31
48.81
 
F  82 80 162  87.8 120 263400 
r  (%) 17.14 166.66 62  62.59 33.33 62.59 
λ  4.52       
),cov( mrFλ  –19.88 27.12 7.23  15.8 0 47400 
 
),cov( mrFF λ−
 
101.88 52.88 154.77  72 120 216000 
Disequilibrium 
value 
78.15 35.75 115.25 113.9 54 90 162000 
Equilibrium 
value 
76.41 39.66 116.07 116.07 54 90 162000 
Disequilibrium 
NPV 
8.15 5.75 15.24 13.9 0 0 0 
Equilibrium 
NPV 
6.41 9.66 16.07 16.07 0 0 0 
Disequilibrium 
NFV 
8.55 12.88 21.43 21.43 0 0 0 
Equilibrium 
NFV 
6.88 19.49 22.44 26.37 0 0 0 
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Table 4. Decreasing net values 
 
 Project Z 
Risky 
security 
Risk-free 
security 
Market (000,000) 
(3 mil. shares) 
Probability 
F  ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
350
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
100
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
120
120
120
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
300
213
294
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
3.0
4.0
3.0
 
Cost/Price  54 54 90 162  
r  (%) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
1.548
48.31
48.81
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
18.85
48.31
48.81
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
3.33
3.33
3.33
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
18.85
48.31
48.81
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
3.0
4.0
3.0
 
r  (%) 201.48 62.59 33.33 62.59  
F  162.8 87.8 120 263.4  
),cov( mrF  20.44 3.49 0 10.486  
λ  4.52     
),cov( mrFλ  92.39 15.8 0 47.4  
),cov( mrFF λ−  70.41 72 120 216  
eV  52.808 54 90 162  
Equilibrium NPV –1.19 0 0 0  
Disequilibrium NFV –1.59 0 0 0  
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Table 5. Range of applicability of DIP and Proposition 4.1 
 
Security market Type of assets 
Dybvig and Ingersoll’s Proposition Complete Securities (marketed assets) 
Proposition 4.1 Incomplete Projects (nonmarketed assets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Project Z is traded in the market (first equilibrium) 
 
 
Project is traded  in the 
Market (1 share) 
Risky security 
(3 mil. Shares) 
Risk-free 
security 
 
Market  
(000,000) 
 
Probability 
F  ⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
350
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
100
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
120
120
120
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
000350.300
000071.213
000098.294
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
3.0
4.0
3.0
 
λ  0.042     
Price  121.57 65.76 90 197.28  
r  (%) 33.91 33.51 33.33 33.51  
NPV 0 0 0 0  
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Table 7. Project Z is traded in the market (second equilibrium) 
 
 
Project is traded  in the 
Market (1 share) 
Risky security  
(3 mil. shares) 
Risk-free 
security 
 
Market  
(000,000) 
 
Probability 
F  
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
350
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
100
71
98
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
120
120
120
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
000350.300
000071.213
000098.294
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
3.0
4.0
3.0
 
λ  3.21     
Price  76.197 58 90 174  
r  (%) 113.65 51.37 33.33 51.37  
NPV 0 0 0 0  
 
